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Abstract 
Given divergent results of studies on the implications of 
employee ownership on performance and low interest 
granted to the probability of the existence of an eventual 
causality. The purpose of this contribution is to check 
whether there is a causal link between the two 
presuppositions and if so, whether the causality is 
unidirectional or bidirectional. Based on the econometrics 
of panel data, the error correction models and low 
exogeneity tests, the results of the econometric 
treatments, on a sample of French companies quoted on 
the stock exchange 120 over a period running from 2000 
to 2012, reveal the existence of two long-term dynamics 
in a single direction from the performance indicators 
(ROA and ROE) to employee ownership. 
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1. Introduction 
Employing a range of psychosocial and financial phenomena, many studies have 
attempted to sketch collective implications, or financial and fiscal virtues which the 
organization enjoys following the introduction of the employee ownership, as measured 
by all types of indicators: growth, profitability, productivity, stock prices, among others 
[Ginglinger et al, (2011); Kruse et al, (2010); Freeman et al, (2011); Pendleton and 
Robinson (2010); Bova et al, (2012) and others]. Notwithstanding, the results of these 
attempts differed and could not match on conclusive results, which does not reach 
conclusive relationship between the employee ownership and performance. However, the 
effectiveness of employee-share ownership, a widely discussed phenomenon that has 
attracted the interest of several disciplines in management science, has not been clearly 
demonstrated; hence we ask the following question: 
Do we observe a performance that improves with the introduction of the employee 
ownership or is it the most successful companies pursuing this practice? 
To approve the underlying reasons for the divergence of results, relatively few studies 
questioned the probability of the existence of a possible causal link between the presence 
of employee ownership and performance [Trébucq,(2002); D’Arcimoles and Trébucq, 
(2003); Caramelli, (2006); Caramelli and Briole, (2007); Aubert (2007)] to the extent that 
it appears to them that there is a relationship of mutual influence that can form a virtuous 
circle, leading them to suggest a circular relationship hypothesis,  illustrating and 
justifying the confluence of psychosocial and financial parameters. 
In contrast, almost all researches highlight the divergence of results in terms of 
correlations and causality patterns. 
Indeed, the purpose of this contribution is to check whether there is a causal link between 
the employee ownership and the performance and if so, whether this causality is 
unidirectional or bidirectional based on some recent developments of the time series 
econometrics, error correction models and low exogeneity tests. The interest that one 
carries to this problem is that it has been, to our knowledge, with no funds for reflection, 
and remains a virgin field of investigation empirically. So we start with a review of 
literature that will allow us to formulate hypotheses about the effects of employee 
ownership on financial performance and vice-versa. These hypotheses will then be tested 
in the empirical analysis, using a sample of 108 French companies in the SBF 120. 
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2. An investigation of the relationship between employee ownership and 
performance: Theoretical basis and research hypotheses 
2.1 The effects of employee ownership on performance 
Many academic and empirical studies have examined the organizational implications of 
the employee ownership. They conclude to the positive effects of said device performance, 
levied on economic performance measures (productivity, financial performance, growth 
...). Let us try to explain the following alternately. 
 
Employee ownership, a source of funds for the company 
Companies that face the insufficiency of their own funds in comparison to what is 
necessary for their operation and growth [Ittner et al, (2003)], need to remedy this 
deficiency, have a dilution lower capital and encourage long-term savings, invested in 
shares. Employee- share ownership meets this goal due to the low share of capital offered 
to shareholders and employees because of the attractive and stable means of financing, 
tax-efficient that presents, allowing the company some financial mobilization that will 
strengthen cash. Such mobilization would allow it not only to send a positive signal to 
financial markets of its financial strength, but also an effective management and this 
through blocked amounts that employees have invested and made available [Alidou, 
(2011)]. These funds invested can indeed be lifted, and the company enjoys tax benefits 
attached to them, which can only be done with a classical capital increase. 
Employee ownership: A means to support growing businesses 
Innovative small and medium enterprise encounter funding difficulties related to poor 
development of venture capital, the difficulty to access the credit market and the capital 
and their little incentive pay. Employee ownership could provide solutions to these 
problems, since it is a deferred compensation that increases the basic salaries and makes 
up for their weakness. This device also allows the undertakings concerned to support 
their growth thanks to its mechanical effect on the market price, resulting in a significant 
excess return of actions having put up and a positive reaction to their markets [Chang, 
(1990); Beatty (1995); Rauh (2006)]. Furthermore, greater resistance to businesses 
vagaries of the economy was observed by [Blair et al, (2000); D’Arcimoles and Brillet, 
(2000); Fakhfakh, (2004); Sesil et al, (2007) and others] showing that business growth 
with an Employee stock ownership plan was faster than that of not having companies. 
Indeed, the study conducted by Blair et al, (2000), points out that companies with a 
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significant employee share were 20% more likely to survive over the period 1983 to 1995 
corroborating the results of Rhokeun Park, Douglas Kruse and James Sesil et al, (2004), 
emphasizing that holding 5% or more of capital by employee shareholders, allow US 
public companies to have 75% more likely to survive over the period 1988-2001. 
 
Employee ownership: A tool that improves productivity 
 Many theoretical and empirical researches have shown that the most successful 
companies in terms of productivity are those that have adopted an employee ownership 
level whatever its form [Pérotin and Robinson (2003); Bryson and Freeman (2010); 
Freeman et al (2011); Kruse et al (2010) and others]. The underlying reasoning is that the 
firm is registered in an optical stakeholder, is developing a cooperative culture that 
enhances the many existing interactions between employees, fostering collaboration 
between them and effective mutual control, which are all factors that revolve around 
productivity and contribute to the improvement [Blasi et al, (2010)]. The strong impact 
on employees’ productivity is also due to the better flow of information that this device 
supports. Indeed, companies with employee ownership adopt a more transparent 
communication of information that is voluntarily submitted to markets to the benefit of 
all investors [Bova et al, (2012)]. Similarly, Ginglinger et al, (2011), by conducting a survey 
of 402 US companies, were able to observe that a 5% hold a positive capital impact 
attitudes and behaviors of employees by reducing the likelihood of 15% strike; a decrease 
that is enhanced by the presence of employee directors. Good numbers of studies, despite 
the dispersion of their numbers, support these results and quantify these productivity 
gains associated with employee ownership. These include that of Blasi, (1996); this 
author found that there is an average difference of 6.2% productivity among small US 
companies that have an ESOP and those that do not. Kruse (2002) believes that this gap 
to 4.4% in US companies is due to the adoption of the plan and 6.6% difference in 
productivity between companies with plans and those without ones. Blasi et al, (2010), 
for their part, consider, having taken into account the selection bias, a productivity 
increase of 4.5%. Although there are differences in the results, all these studies are 
consistent with a positive correlation between employee ownership and productivity in 
small structures. The underlying reasoning is that this device limits the behavior of 
“stowaway”. These studies consolidate those Desbrières, (2002); Oyer and Schaefer of, 
(2004); Pendleton (2006) and Sesil et al, (2007) and Blasi et al, (2010) providing that the 
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larger the size of the enterprise is, the greater the behaviors abandonment of stowaways 
are. 
 
Employee ownership: catalysis enhancing financial profitability 
Many studies have used a variety of fairly wide performance indicators and compared 
them with the financial profitability of companies, having implemented employee 
ownership plans. The results they have found provide that corporate profitability has 
implemented an employee ownership higher than not having implemented [Conte and 
Tannenbaum (1978), Wagner and Rosen (1985) and D’ Arcimoles Brillet, (2000)]. The 
study by Park and Song (1995) testifies to these results. Indeed, these authors observed 
an improvement in the performance of firms equipped ESOP measured by economic 
profitability (ROA) and Tobin’Q, during the three years following the establishment of the 
ESOP and in the presence of large external shareholders. Dondi (1992), concluded that 
the positive effect of employee ownership on financial returns for a small shareholding by 
employees, or 10% of capital held by employees, beyond and below, whereof the financial 
profitability change variation. D’ Arcimoles and Trébucq, (2003); Faleye et al, (2006) and 
Kim and Paige, (2011), on their part, have stressed that significant levels of employee 
ownership (above 5%), companies consistently underperformed. The massive and 
widespread dissemination of employee ownership keeps away, within the meaning of 
these authors, employees of the goal of maximizing shareholder value, and is far from 
being an effective way to align the interests of shareholders with those of employees. 
These results consolidate those of Ginglinger et al, (2011) which, on a sample of SBF120 
companies, showed an improvement in the financial performance for a lower holding 3% 
over a period that stretches from 1998 to 2008, while it is negative for a greater than 10% 
holding. 
With regard to these developments, we need only assume a positive effect of employee 
ownership on the financial performance of the company. Thus, we attempt in the 
following to test the previous research hypotheses more rigorously: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The employee share measured by the percentage of shares held by 
employees is positively associated with the financial performance of companies. 
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2.2. The impact of performance on the employee ownership 
Theoretical developments recommended in this paragraph are intended to understand 
the conditions and even the determinants of the presence and development of the practice 
of employee ownership. From the outset, we admit that there is a high tendency to the 
development of this device and subscription of shares in successful companies. We issue 
then the following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The performance has a positive impact on the development of the 
practice of employee ownership. 
 
2.2.1. Development Trend of employee ownership in successful companies 
Employee ownership, with all the benefits it offers to employees and companies, is widely 
used successfully in the performing companies [Wang et al, (2009)]. Indeed, the 
performance is an indicator of good management and good corporate financial health. 
Thus, a company that produces a good performance can easily open its capital to its 
employees who will themselves be encouraged to invest [Bergman and Jenter, (2007)]. 
Conversely, we assume that a company making poor performance is less likely to transfer 
ownership of its capital to the latter. Many variables are presented as performance 
indicators and justify the presence and development of the practice known. The size of 
the business is one. Indeed, many reports on employee savings and many surveys show 
the uneven distribution of employee ownership is the fact of large companies. As for SMEs 
with fewer than 50 employees, with the exception of certain innovative companies with 
high growth, they remain outside the movement and practice only one of two basic forms 
of employee savings very marginally: participation, for which they escape any legal 
obligation and sharing. 
Recently, according to the latest survey Opinion Way, 2012, nearly three-quarters of SMEs 
growing remained independent of this practice to 100%. This is explained by the 
reluctance of the latter to open their capital and by manifesting some suspicion with 
regard to outside investors. This unequal distribution of the employee ownership is 
explained, first of all, by the fact that this practice raises first employee savings policy that 
is in place in the company. But SMEs are not publicly traded. They are in a difficult form 
said savings. Then, according to the study by INSEE, employee savings are strongly linked 
to high wage rate and require a condition of seniority. Based on this observation, we 
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recognize that employees of SMEs are not, most of them, beneficiaries of employee savings 
schemes. This is explained first by mobility and precarious workers in SMEs. Then, the 
savings capacity of those employees is often limited, and even when positive, tends to 
favor savings liquid and secure care. Taking into account the size effect is essential to 
identify the nature of the link between company performance and employee ownership. 
Therefore, the following research hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2, a: The firm size is positively associated with employee ownership 
 
 
A higher trend for subscription of shares in successful companies: 
Purchase of securities that generate arbitrage, whose choices determinants are risk and 
stock market prospects of their business, are established by employees. 
The risk: determinant of choice of subscription: 
The practice of employee ownership, although it is obvious that has undeniable assets, 
represents an opportunity enjoyed by the employee shareholder; it is nonetheless fraught 
with risks for the latter. The savings invested by employees fluctuate with the business 
results and the discretion of the share price if the company is listed. By doing so, a 
communication error or a bad market appreciation can lower the share price of the listed 
company significantly and thereby devalue the savings of employees without this 
impoverishment being commensurate with their work in the company. Thus, employees, 
underestimating the risk attached to the shares of their business and investing in shares 
in the same company, will acquire securities of the latter if its market performance is good, 
i.e.,  if the course is high [Benartzi et al, (2007) and Blasi et al, (2010)]. However, in times 
of economic insecurity, employees are reluctant to purchase of securities of their 
company and show a strong preference for a fixed compensation, reflecting their strong 
aversion vis-à-vis risk [Blasi et al, (2010)]. Employee ownership introduced then a 
considerable financial risk and non-diversifiable in compensation of employees: the risk 
of losing their jobs and the risk of losing their heritage [Maalej and Triki, (2008)]. The risk 
of double losses may explain the reluctance expressed by the employees to the 
development of this practice. In this perspective, we plan to test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2, b: Employee ownership is negatively associated with risk. 
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 Policy action variable dividends for subscription: 
The decision to purchase of securities by employees raises questions on income they get 
following their subscription. Thus, they require that a signal be launched at this 
information to be conveyed on the financial health of the company. They do this by 
excessive extrapolation of profitability. That is to say, they consider past profitability of 
the shares of their company as representative of future performance [Aubert, (2005)]. 
They also have a real need for a guarantee to be protected against unfair acts that can be 
committed against them by their deviant behavior of certain players. The dividend policy 
meets the expectations of employees, given that the meaning of Dog et al, (2005); Angelo 
et al, (2006); Denis and Osobov, (2008) and more recently Albouy et al, (2010), one of the 
key financial variables that allows on the one hand to reduce information asymmetry in 
financial markets by providing investors with the ability to significantly reassess the 
companies in question securities and have a clear vision on the future benefits they expect 
it. On the other hand, the dividend policy allows controlling the behavior of actors, forcing 
them to justify the capital amounts used and to limit the waste of resources, in case of new 
projects financing [La Porta et al, (2000)]. This makes the dividend a determining variable 
of decisive choices to subscribe for employee share plans, so we hypothesize to test this: 
 
H2, c: employee ownership is positively related to a high rate of dividend distribution. 
 
3. Model specification and estimation methodology 
The methodology adopted in the context of this article specifies the model used and 
operationalize the variables (2.1), to present the various tests and statistics tools we used 
in (2.2) and interpret the empirical results obtained and the interpretations thereof (2.3). 
3.1. Model and retained variables 
Our goal is to empirically validate the assumptions while trying to test the link between 
performance indicators and employee ownership. To do so, the model that we suggest is 
written as follows: 
 
 =  () + () +  
 
Where: 
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: Matrix of endogenous variables measuring the performance of sample firms. In our 
specification, we note: 
The return on assets (ROA): measure of economic profitability. It is also the ratio of net 
income and total assets. 
Return on equity (ROE): measure of financial profitability. It is the ratio between the net 
income and equity. 
Stakeholder value (PV): measured by the value added that corresponds to the difference 
between output and intermediate consumption. 
  : Matrix or exogenous variables. Employee share (SHEQ) is the predictor of the 
performance of retaining businesses. It’s a datum in our specification quantified 
measured by the percentage of shares held by employees. 
To better understand the weight of employee ownership in the model, we used the return 
variable in dividends and the risk (beta), which measures the sensitivity of the security 
relative to market changes and those to better specify the model. 
: Matrix of control variables that are key determinants of business performance [On 
Arcimoles and Trébucq, (2003); Hu and Zhou (2008); Margaritis and Psillaki, (2010)]. 
They contain: 
 The company’s size measured by the logarithms of total assets and total number 
of employees 
 The debt equals to the ratio between long-term liabilities and total assets. 
 The solvency ratio equals to the ratio between short-term and short-term 
liabilities assets 
 : The random perturbations which are uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
 
3.2. Method of estimation 
To test the relationship between employee ownership and performance, we use 
econometric panel data. The advantage of this type of data is that it will allow us to realize 
not only the dynamics of behavior, but also for possible heterogeneity. By doing so, the 
data used in our study cover 108 French SBF120 companies, of which 70 are service 
companies (transport, health, insurance) and the remaining 41 include  industrial ones, 
over a period that stretches from 2000 to 2012, 1 404 comments retrieved from the 
database "Thomson One". 
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• Homogeneity Test 
The first step to establish a panel data sample is to verify the homogeneous or 
heterogeneous specification of the data generating process [Sevestre, (2002)]. Basically, 
the coefficients of the model should be tested in their individual dimension. Economically, 
the test specification is intended to check whether the theoretical model studied, which 
seems exactly the same for all individuals, or conversely it has the same characteristics of 
the underlying variables. 
In general, the theoretical model by which we will test the homogeneity is written as 
follows: 
 
 =  + 
, + , 
With αi: the individual effect; βi = (β1i, β2i ...... ..βki) is a vector of dimension (1, k) and Xit 
= (X1i, X2i ...... .Xki): the vector of explanatory variables with K = 1 ...... n. The ε corresponds 
to the innovations (i,t), which are assumed to be identical with zero average and variance 
equal to 
 for all i. 
The homogeneity test procedure includes work under Hurlin (2002), three stages; the 
first is to test the hypothesis of a perfectly homogeneous structure. In other words, it is 
checked if the constants and coefficients are the same and through the establishment of 
Fisher statistic with (K+1) (N-1) and NT-N (K+1) degree of freedom: 
 
   
:  =     =   
   
 =   ≠    ≠  
 
 
In the second step, we check whether the K vecteurs βi components are equal or not for 
all individuals, using the Fisher statistic with K (N-1) and NT-N (K + 1) degree of freedom: 
 
   
:  =  
 
:  ≠   
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In the third, we have to test the presence of individual effect αi, using the Hausman test. 
• Hausman test 
The Hausman specification test (1979) is applied to the test specification problems of the 
individual effects in a panel. The interest stems from its implementation is the 
discrimination of fixed and random effects [Hurlin, (2002)]. The hypothesis tested carries 
the meaning of this author on the correlation of the individual effects and the explanatory 
variables: 
 
  : (\!) = 0 
  : (\!) ≠0 
 
 
Under H0, the model can be specified with random individual effects. The estimator 
retained will be in this case the MCG or called (BLUE Estimator). Under the alternative 
hypothesis, it is the individual fixed effects that specify the model and request that Within 
Estimator should be put in place (unbiased estimator). 
The Hausman test statistic is applied to the test specification of the individual effects is as 
follows: 
 
H= ( − ) [$%&( − )]
(( − ) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, the H statistic follows asymptotically a chi-K degree of 
freedom. 
 
3.3. Results and interpretations 
• Homogeneity test 
 
The results show that the constants and coefficients are heterogeneous. Fisher statistics 
calculated for our sample are greater than the Fisher statistic tabulated at the 5% 
threshold. We, therefore, reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity of the individual effect. 
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Table 1: Test of homogeneity 
 Homogeneity of constants Homogeneity of coefficients  
ROA 
ROE 
Stakeholder value 
Employee 
ownership ROA 
ROE 
Stakeholder value 
F(9,1323)   =      6.47(0.0000) 
F(9,1323) =   14.85 (0.0000) 
F(9,1323)   =    2.33 (0.0132) 
  
F(9,1323)=   195.95 
(0.0000) 
F(9,1323)  =  196.32 
(0.0000) 
F(9,1323)=    197.23 
(0.0000) 
F(110, 1323) =    1.31 
(0.0209) 
F(110, 1323) =    2.10 
(0.0000) 
F(110, 1323) =   0.85 (0.8589) 
 
F(110, 1323) =  17.57 
(0.0000) 
F(110, 1323)=    
17.61(0.0000) 
F(110, 1323) =  17.69 
(0.0000) 
 
• Test of Hausman  
To specify this effect, we use Hausman test (1979). The aim is to verify the existence of a 
fixed individual effect or random effect. Under the null hypothesis, the Hausman statistic 
follows a chi-square degree of freedom equal to the number of coefficients. Thus, under 
the null hypothesis, the theoretical model can be specified with random individual effects 
and we must therefore retain the estimator GCM (the BLUE estimator). Under the 
alternative hypothesis, the model must be specified with fixed individual effects and we 
must retain LSDV Within estimator (the unbiased estimator). Table 2 summarizes the 
Hausman test for the two models below mentioned. 
Table 2: Test of Hausman 
 ROA ROE Stakeholder 
value 
 
Employee ownership 
ROA ROE V P  
Stat-
Hausman  
P-value 
Chi2(9)= 
135.09 
0.0000 
Chi2(9)= 
146.72 
0.0000 
Chi2(9)= 
35.39 
0.0001 
Chi2(9)= 
18.07 
0.0344 
Chi2(9)= 
17.83 
0.0372 
Chi2(9)= 
18.50 
0.0298 
 
According to the estimation results, we note that all models are subject to a fixed effect. 
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3.4 Panel data estimated without commitment 
The estimate in the context of our model is conditioned upon the identification criteria of 
the model. The results show that our model is well identified. In this case, the appropriate 
estimation method is the least squares. 
 
Table 3: Results of estimation 
Variables  Sign 
Performance Employee ownership 
Shareholder Partnership 
Employee 
ownership 
+ +  
Performance   + 
Log total assets + - + 
Solvency ratio + + - 
Debt + + - 
Size - + - 
Risk + - + 
Dividend + - + 
 
The results of the estimation of our model, shown in Table 4, indicate a positive effect on 
employee share respectively (ROA and ROE), regardless of the percentage of capital held 
by employees. The hypothesis (H1) is confirmed. Also, these results show the absence of 
a threshold effect in the relationship between the two presuppositions which corroborate 
the results generated by Dondi (1992) and Guedri and Hollandts, (2008). The results 
show, at the same time, the decisive influence of shareholder performance with two 
indicators (ROA and ROE) and partnership performance on the employee ownership. This 
result that reinforces the idea of a strong and positive association between this practice 
and a high level of performance can be explained by the fact that a company having 
achieved a good performance will be promoted by virtue of its financial situation and 
return on capital, to open its capital and employees, optimistic about their company’s past 
performance, there will be enticed to buy securities. This result is one of Bergman and 
Jenter (2007) showing that it is the past performance of the company that brings 
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employees to purchase shares of their company. Conversely, we assume that a company 
whose performance is poor will struggle to encourage employees to invest in shares of 
the latter. The H2 is confirmed. 
Table 3 shows that the variable size displays a sign contrary to expectations, H2 
hypothesis was that employee ownership is more common in large companies is not 
confirmed. Our results consolidate the observations of Desbrières (2002); Kruse (2002); 
Oyer (2004); Pendleton (2006); Sesil et al (2007) and Blasi et al (2010), which provide 
that employee share ownership, under the assumption 1 / N, would be more effective in 
smaller structures. The underlying reasoning is that the higher the size of the company is, 
the greater abandonment the behaviors of stowaways are. 
The results show the positive influence of dividend policy on the presence and 
development of the practice of employee ownership. The resulting positive relationship 
can be explained by two arguments because of the requirements of agency theory. First, 
the payment of dividends would limit the waste of resources through the effective control 
of managerial guidance it internalizes in them, forced to justify the amounts of capital 
used in case of new projects financing. Second, it allows the flexibility for investors to 
significantly reassess the companies in question securities and have a clear vision on the 
future benefits they expect. This result confirms the findings from the literature review 
examined on the role of this variable on employee shareholding operations. Hypothesis 2 
is confirmed. 
Furthermore, we anticipated a negative relationship between risk and employee share 
practice. The sign obtained for this variable that measures the sensitivity of the title to 
market changes (Beta) is contrary to our expectations. Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed, 
since employee ownership is positively associated with risk. This result can be explained 
by the fact that companies in our sample have a stable form of employee ownership and 
have succeeded in structuring employee shareholding so as to reconcile liquidity and 
stability which is consistent with the study of Sesil et al (2006); Brown et al (2006) and 
Maalej and Triki (2008), who observed that the risk is lower in companies with 
established employee share ownership and that these companies are less exposed to the 
risk of bankruptcy. 
After estimating the model, our objective goes beyond the simple sketch of the sign 
correlation between employee ownership and performance, but rather to wonder about 
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the existence of a possible causality between so-called pre-suppositions. Thereby, we will 
proceed to what follows the causality tests agreed. 
4.  Short and Long Term causality Test 
We will try in what follows to test the short-term causality (CT) and the long term one 
(LT) between employee ownership (SHEQ) and performance measured by (ROE) and 
(ROA). 
4.1. Short term causality Test (CT) 
Granger (1969) defines causality between two variables as follows: we say that the 
variable Y is the cause of the predictability of X if X is improved when all the information 
for Y is considered. Thus, a variable Y brings about a variable X if the past can improve the 
prediction of the value X given the past of Y. 
According to the released results, we can confirm: 
Bidirectional causality between employee share (SHEQ) and the variable measuring 
financial profitability (ROE) is rejected. In the short term, employee ownership does not 
cause the financial profitability, and this profitability does not favor short-term 
employees the choice to hold the company’s securities. 
The absence of causal link is justified by the fact that the capital used by enterprises need 
the time to be invested wisely and in high return projects (selective). Thus the business 
or optimization of the company’s capital is not immediate, for it encourages employees to 
hold its securities. Furthermore, the (ONE) may reflect the effectiveness of the use of the 
equity of the company and learn about the policy and the company financing 
arrangements that will be assessed by the employees before their decision to acquire the 
titles thereof. 
They should ensure indeed: 
- Diversification of the company’s financing means to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. 
- The cost of financing that should be minimized through diversification. 
- The credibility of the company to the various donors for the continuity of funding. 
- The company’s financial health: is it undermined by the payment of arrears if they exist. 
- The increase in the profitability prospects is possible with a far-sighted and strategic 
vision of the company’s decision makers with respect to confront the constraints and 
assets available to the company. 
 Therefore, it is not so easy an employee can have all this information to a short-term 
horizon in order to acquire shares and become shareholders. This legitimizes the lack of 
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causality between (SHEQ) and (ROE). Also there is a short-term lack of causality between 
economic profitability (ROA) and employee share (SHEQ). The economic profitability that 
provides information on the company’s ability to generate net income using all of its 
resources may in the distant horizon (not short term) positively impact the selection of 
employees to participate in the capital of the company through the holding of securities. 
We concluded a lack of short-term causality between the performance indicators and the 
index of employee ownership. This result is consistent with most theoretical assumptions 
confirming a positive link but not short-term causal relationship between these two 
presupposed. It is therefore necessary to verify the existence of long-term causal 
relationship between employee ownership and corporate performance. 
4.2. Long term Causality between Employee Ownership and Performance Measures 
To test the long-term causality, we adopt the method of Johanson and Juselius (1988). 
This method is based on estimating the following error correction equation known (MCE) 
to highlight a long period of co-integrating relationship. Finally, it allows through a test 
called “low exogeneity” detecting the direction of causality (LT). 
 
(MCE) : ∆Yt  =∑
=
n
i 1
bi ∆log yt-i  +  ∑
=
n
i 1
aj ∆log x t-j – β i û1t-1 + ε 1t 
 
If β  (estimated) is statistically significant, we can affirm the existence of a long-term 
causality from Yt to Xt. In addition, the sign must be negative so that we can have an error 
correction mechanism. 
4.2.1. Long term Causality relationship between (SHEQ) and (ROA) 
According to our estimates, the long-term relationship found may be expressed as follows: 
 
                                    ROA=  0.24 SHEQ +0.8 
                                                 (-1.6) 
 
In the long term, 24% of the increase in the variable corporate economic returns is due to 
the increase of one unit of the numbers of employees’ shareholders. Thus a quarter of the 
increase (ROA) is explained by the preference of employees to hold company stock. This 
long-term relationship allows us to write the following error correction equation: 
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         ∆(*+,) = 0.6 ∆*+,(--0.22∆*+,(.-0.43∆/012(- + 3. 35∆/012(. -0.8267(- 
                           (25.23)               (-7.17)                                                            (-20.25)     
 
Note that in the short term, the change in the variable (ROA) depends on its previous 
values shifted by two periods (the coefficients are significant) but does not depend on 
variations of the variable (SHEQ), confirming the clear absence of short-term causality 
between the two variables. Furthermore, in long-term and under the combined effect of 
changes (ROA) and (SHEQ), one can correct 82% of the imbalance, which is consistent. A 
low exogeneity test will be conducted on the error term. This test is written as follows: 
                               03:  = 3 
                               0-:   ≠ 3 
 
It is noted that ε (t-1) is of a negative and significant sign (| -20.55 |> 2) and the variable 
(ROA) is said non- weakly exogenous. 
Similarly, our estimates show that the variable (SHEQ) is weakly exogenous; the one-way 
long-term causality is certainly: 
 
ROA → SHEQ 
First long-term direction of causality 
 
We note, statistically, the model (R 2 = 0.63) has an acceptable goodness of fit with a 
strong overall significance of the model (F = 483.14: high). 
This result appears to be consistent with our predictions and our theoretical assumptions. 
Improving the company’s economic viability sends positive signals to employees: the 
effectiveness of the use of resources of the company and their level of optimization 
encourage employees to access the company’s capital by securities holding. 
 4.2.2. Long Term Causality relationship between (SHEQ) and (ROE) 
The long-term relationship between the released employee ownership and financial 
profitability measuring performance in our modeling is as follows: 
 
                                    ROE = 1.54 + 0.23 SHEQ 
                                                (-2.5) 
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It raises a positive and significant relationship between long-term employee ownership 
and financial performance. Indeed employee ownership helps to increase return on 
equity of the company to 154% which is very significant. The detention of the capital 
shares of companies on the part of employees positively affects the profitability of the 
funds made available to companies, allowing them to generate significant bottom-line 
results. The long-term positive correlation between (SHEQ) and (ROE) is consistent with 
our theoretical findings confirming the positive sign that binds these two presupposed. 
The existence of this long-term relationship allows writing and interpreting the error 
correction model presented as follows: 
    ∆(*+1) = -0.06 ∆*+1(--0.01∆*+1(. -1.63∆/012(- − 3. 58∆9:;<7(. -0.5567(. 
                           (-5.-3)                  (-1.48)                                                           (-18.24)     
 
         According to the estimated equation above, the financial profitability does not 
depend in the short term on its lagged values of two periods or values delayed by two 
periods of employee ownership. 
The coefficients found are not significant in the short term, which means that the 
imbalance of the variable (ROE) in the short term cannot be corrected by the change in 
employee ownership. This result reinforces the finding of lack of causality between the 
SHEQ and short-term ROE. A low exogeneity test on the error term allows viewing the 
long-term dynamics between the variables of the model. 
              
                               03:  = 3 
                               0-:   ≠ 3 
 
The error term is of a negative sign and is highly significant (-0.55) and (| -18.28 |> 2), 
which implies the existence of an error correction mechanism to restore the changes in 
the endogenous variable (ROE) to its equilibrium level. Thus, long-term and in the 
combination of SHEQ and variable values of the endogenous variable (ROE) itself can be 
corrected 55% of imbalance. The ROE variable is said to be non-weakly exogenous when, 
according to our estimates, the ES variable is weakly exogenous, so we can deduce the 
following long-term causal relationship: 
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ROE →SHEQ 
One-way long-term causality 
 
One direction of causality is clear from long-term financial return to employee ownership. 
Thus, the high return on capital can motivate and encourage employees to take part in 
capital and become shareholders. As the economic profitability, financial performances 
achieved by companies in the sample cause and influence the decisions of the employee 
to hold share capital: these two indicators, if they are at high levels, send positive signals 
when the sustainability businesses and the present of the company ensure its future 
performance and survival. An employee shareholder ensuring the ability of the company 
to confront the various constraints, and the profit (dividend) that can be charged on its 
holding of securities will continually grow will not hesitate to become a shareholder of 
the business. 
5. Conclusion 
In this contribution, we wished to empirically examine the effects of employee ownership 
on performance of French companies and vice-versa. Our results reveal a positive and 
statistically significant effect between the two variables of interest. Furthermore, our 
results show that there is a positive impact of financial and economic performance 
achieved by these companies on the preference of employees to hold share capital 
through the acquisition of securities. Our findings also suggest a long-run unidirectional 
causal relationship from financial variables to employee ownership, while the reverse 
causality is not verified. The lack of two-way causal relationship and specifically of 
causality from the employee ownership to the performance indicators included can be 
checked  in future researches and especially when employees becoming shareholders of 
the company will be more confident and reassure the financial, economic and 
organizational perspectives of the company in which they own a stake. These findings 
appear of utmost importance in terms of policies and business strategies. 
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